

COMPUTADAS: 346 GUERRERO

RESULTADOS (CON NUMERO)

MAYORIA RELATIVA	REPRESENTACION PROPORCIONAL	SENADORES POR EL PRINCIPIO DE REPRESENTACION PROPORCIONAL
9044	8985	9077
26876	26756	27265
39519	39355	38621
894	893	978
1094	1090	1216
2425	2410	2628
349	348	370
361	360	344
CANDIDATOS NO REGISTRADOS: 13	13	10
TOTAL DE VOTOS VALIDOS: 80575	80210	80509
TOTAL DE VOTOS NULOS: 1637	1626	1588

EL CONSEJERO PRESIDENTE DEL CONSEJO DISTRITAL

HORSEMA CASTRO



SUBNATIONAL POLITICS and DEMOCRATIZATION in MEXICO

edited by
 Wayne A. Cornelius
 Todd A. Eisenstadt
 Jane Hindley

Alternation and Political Liberalization: The PAN in Baja California

Víctor Alejandro Espinoza Valle

In 1994 and 1995, the Mexican political system underwent a dramatic crisis that for many observers signaled the end of the regime. Like all political crises, this one was characterized by the regime's inability to satisfy social demands using existing strategies. What differentiated it from past crises was that the administration's efforts to employ new strategies of "political opening" served only to undermine the corporatist pillars on which the governing structure was based. The outcome was increasing uncertainty about the future configuration of state-society relations and the means for arriving at new political agreements.

Uncertainty is a defining characteristic of all political liberalization processes. Political liberalization in Mexico dates from the political opening that occurred during the administration of President Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) in response to the democratic student movement of 1968.¹ In the late 1980s and 1990s, political opening expanded to include recognition by Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of opposition-party electoral victories in races for municipal government posts and state governorships. But these advances in formal democracy have proved insufficient. Liberalization has not brought about the dismantling of Mexican authoritarianism. In fact, it

Translation by Sandra del Castillo.

¹Editors' note: On October 2, 1968, students assembled in downtown Mexico City to demand democracy. Hundreds were slain by members of the Mexican army. Luis Echeverría, then minister of the interior, was blamed for ordering the use of the military force against the demonstrators.

appears that liberalization may stop short of substantive democratization. Whether the Mexican political regime democratizes or remains authoritarian will depend largely on the nation's president. This dilemma of the executive possibly decentralizing his or her way out of power forms the focus of this chapter.

The following discussion reflects first on the role that local alternation in power can play in the broader transition to democratization. It then reviews the constraints that a presidential form of government can exert on the possibilities for such a transition at the local level. It concludes by analyzing the significance of the election of Ernesto Ruffo Appel, candidate of the right-wing opposition National Action Party (PAN), to the governorship of Baja California in July 1989—and the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's (1988–1994) recognition of the victory and its decision to cooperate with the new state government—and what it meant for the opening up of Mexico's corporatist governing structure.

Local Alternation in Power, Political Liberalization, and National Transition

One essential element in a democratic transition is the alternation of parties in elective office. Governor Ruffo's election in 1989 was the first acknowledged state-level opposition victory in over a half-century of Mexican elections. This step forward in Mexico's "fall into modernity"² was seen widely as a major achievement of Baja California's civil society, and the federal government's acceptance of it was seen as a major advance on the part of the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari.

One sign of Mexico's increasing political liberalization is the widespread agreement in national discourse that the goal of this process must be substantive democracy. Where disagreements arise is in regard to how the transition should be accomplished. For example, one faction sees political alternation as the most direct path toward democratization of the Mexican political system. Election victories by the National Action Party and other opposition parties would give them control over state governments. And, through a "demonstration effect," these state governments would generate a growing and mutually reinforcing wave of national substantive democracy that would ultimately reach the core of the political system. Yemile Mizrahi refers to this process as the "centripetal" route to democracy: "The dynamic of political change seems to flow from the regions toward the center. This dynamic ... which begins gradually with alternation in power at

² This term was coined by Adolfo Gilly (1988).

the local level, has emerged as one of the most feasible, and most stable, routes to political change... In a strongly centralized, authoritarian country like Mexico, the introduction of democratic reforms at the local level and the consequent revitalization of federalism constitute one of the few paths to political transition. Such a scenario converts the local political arena into an ideal environment for democratizing Mexico's political system" (Mizrahi 1995: 180, 185, 187).

Lorenzo Meyer agrees: "When, and if, political democracy arrives in Mexico, it may well be that it does not come about as the result of a macropolitical transformation, as occurred years ago in Portugal, Spain, and South America, but rather through incremental transformations." For Meyer, the victory of PAN gubernatorial candidate Francisco Barrio in Chihuahua in 1992 signaled that the state's citizenry had been able to "impose a democratic transition," underscoring this author's identification of alternation with democratic transition (Meyer 1994: 7, 13).

On the other side of the issue is the faction of "pessimists" who view the ongoing liberalization process as "alternation without transition." According to Carlos Ramírez (1995), Mexico is not experiencing the emergence of a democratic regime, but merely a change in how the ruling party wields power. Absent a democratic project, alternation will only reproduce the authoritarian system.³ Because the PAN does not have a national plan that clearly distinguishes it from the ruling party, the prospects for continuing the process of democratization are substantially reduced. Observers adhering to this "pessimistic" outlook minimize the importance of the changes in political culture that co-occur with alternation at the state level, changes which are taking place, in the final analysis, within the confines of a corporatist system.

There is one additional perspective that might be brought to bear on the processes of political opening under way in Mexico's political system. From this perspective, the visible changes within the political sphere over the last ten years have not altered the system's authoritarian nature. Although there has been some opening, particularly in local-level elections, this does not mean that Mexico is headed toward a transition to democracy. For Soledad Loaeza, the Mexican experience "disproves the assumption that liberalization has only two possible outcomes: the hardening of authoritarianism (also called

³ This is also the opinion of Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN): "Alternation is not synonymous with democratic change nor its effectiveness, but with doubtful compromises and breaks in policy.... The policies of the National Action Party in Baja California, Jalisco, and Chihuahua are far from being 'different' from what went before." Indeed, so authoritarian are they that they have included attempts to regulate dress codes in Guadalajara and Monterrey, thinly veiled references to conservative social policies (Marcos 1996).

"normalization") or democratization.... Successful liberalization does not necessarily produce democratization.... It can also produce an outcome that responds to its own logic.... Mexico's successive liberalizations have sometimes been aimed at preserving the status quo rather than responding to a supposed democratizing imperative" (Loeza 1993: 48-49, 51-52). Given that liberalization is an open process with little institutionalization, it creates a high level of uncertainty in regard to its outcome and the future.

The Presidency and Presidentialism

Mexico's presidentialist form of government is mirrored in the political structure that exists within the individual states. At the state level, as at the federal level, legislative and judicial authorities are subordinate to the executive and to the clientelistic practices of the corporatist sociopolitical structure (Espinoza 1994a). This pattern holds true at the level of local government as well (see Ziccardi 1995; Espinoza 1992a: 119-22). The experience of Ernesto Ruffo Appel is illustrative. Before being elected governor of Baja California in 1989, Ruffo was elected municipal president of Ensenada, in 1986. One of Municipal President Ruffo's primary objectives was to increase the share of revenues that the state government returned to the municipality. He succeeded in his efforts, and Ensenada's share of state funds was increased substantially as of January 1, 1990. By this time, however, Ruffo had already been elected governor, and during his tenure in this latter post, with a PAN majority in the state legislature, Ruffo was able to reduce Ensenada's municipal budget to its previous level. He justified his action as follows: "If we increase the revenues that are returned to the municipalities, we will be unable to grant salary increases to teachers and government workers." His actions make it undeniably clear that, party affiliations aside, local governments' requests for resources to meet social demands are not a priority in Mexico's centralized political structure. Ruffo's response also demonstrates how quick the transition can be from opposition party to party in power (Espinoza 1993: 302-305).

The reform initiatives that the Mexican government proposed from the 1980s forward included programs whose purported objective was to promote political and administrative decentralization. Paradoxically, many decentralizing efforts served to reinforce the centralized political system. For example, a study of the spatial distribution of public employment conducted by the author found that the number of federal bureaucrats in Mexico City declined from 885,608 to 813,556 between 1982 and 1989. Concurrently, the number of federal employees distributed throughout the rest of the country in-

creased from 1,147,306 to 1,596,204. Measured another way, in 1982 there were 0.44 local employees for every federal employee; in 1989, the ratio was 0.39 local workers per federal employee.⁴ What had happened was that federal *employees*, not political power, had been decentralized, effectively increasing the reach of the federal government into the states and hence strengthening even more the power of the centralized government (Espinoza 1993: 88-94).

This example suggests that structural constraints can limit the chances for substantive democratization at the level of state government. And this, in turn, implies that we must include "national factors" if we are fully to understand local politics.⁵ The importance of national factors at the local level is reiterated by Lorenzo Meyer in his review of the PRI's recognition of Francisco Barrio in 1991 as the second PANista to be elected governor of a Mexican state. According to Meyer, this outcome was possible only in light of agreements signed by the PRI and the PAN prior to the 1988 presidential election, agreements intended to marginalize the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) during that campaign. From that time forward, the federal government viewed the PAN as its "loyal opposition," not as a threat to national sovereignty. Hence, there was no need to resort to electoral fraud to keep it out of office.⁶

Losing local offices to the loyal opposition is no longer seen as a threat to the stability of the Mexican political system. To the contrary, since 1989 the PRI government has viewed the PAN's electoral victories as an investment in its own legitimacy. Nevertheless, the system is certainly not fully open; opposition victories become less likely the higher the elective office in question. That is, a loyal opposition has a better chance of winning—and gaining recognition for its victory—in local races than in state-level races, and virtually no chance at claiming the presidency. In this regard, Mizrahi notes that "at the state and municipal levels, electoral contests tend to be two-party races, either between the PRI and the PAN or between the PRI and the PRD, which

⁴ The federal bureaucracy has long been "big business" in Mexico and a major source of the government's legitimacy. See Aguilar Villanueva 1991.

⁵ According to Alberto Aziz Nassif, since 1988 regional events have become interlinked with events at the national level, and together the two mark the pace of democratization. Thus, gains at either the regional or municipal level are not necessarily the forerunners of change. For that we must look to the interaction of regional advances with extraordinary happenings on the national stage (Aziz Nassif 1994a: 209-10). Also see Aziz Nassif 1994b: 8-9, for the interaction of national and local factors in the state of Chihuahua.

⁶ The change in campaign rhetoric is almost certainly due more to external factors than to the situation in Chihuahua itself. In 1992, the major threat to the government and the PRI was not the PAN but the PRD under the leadership of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. The government's objective was to block any possible alliance between the PRD and the PAN. See Meyer 1994: 13.

increases the opposition's chances of winning." By recognizing the opposition's victories at these levels, "the PRI can share power with the opposition within a circumscribed territory without losing control of the presidency and the highest levels of power. And giving the opposition parties the opportunity to govern states and municipalities spurs these parties to moderate their positions and work toward achieving consensus between the opposition and the government" (Mizrahi 1995: 187–99).⁷

Baja California, 1989–1995: Contained Alternation

The PAN's rising political fortunes in Baja California reflect the state's highly politicized and independent-minded society. Recent political history in the state traces an unbroken struggle to win recognition of PAN victories in state and municipal elections. Yet the deciding factor in winning PRI–government recognition for Ruffo's gubernatorial win in 1989 was not the efforts of civil society to assure a free and fair election but, rather, a deliberate decision on the part of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994).⁸ It proved to be a wise decision and one that gave an excellent rate of return in legitimacy for the Salinas administration—although it did damage the relationship between the PRI's local contingent and the party's National Executive Committee (see Espinoza 1992b).⁹ There can be little doubt that this "selective democracy" is the result of the ruling party's calculated generosity toward the PAN, a strategy designed to undermine the threat from the Left.¹⁰

⁷ Meyer (1994: 15) notes that "bipartisanship ... in a macropolitical scenario in which there are three, not two, major factions—and where an alliance between oppositions could dismantle an authoritarian system—would appear, for the time being at least, impossible."

⁸ "In the state and municipal elections that followed the installation of the Salinas administration, some PAN victories were allowed to stand, others were not; and winning recognition of opposition election victories sometimes required demonstrations, threats of violence, and appeals to the international community. Thus, in 1989, *by presidential decision*, election authorities and the PRI accepted the election of Ernesto Ruffo as governor of Baja California" (Meyer 1993, emphasis added).

⁹ The political costs had it *not* acknowledged the PAN victory inclined the Salinas administration to set aside the concerns of the local PRI contingent.

¹⁰ The PRD (in 1988 still called the National Democratic Front, or FDN) showed substantial strength in the 1988 presidential elections, coming very close to winning Mexico's highest office. According to Mauricio Merino Huerta: "The PRI has adopted a posture of 'calculated generosity' toward PAN candidates in local elections ... in a strategy that serves, with increasing effectiveness, to challenge the PRD in areas that it has claimed for itself" (1993: 65).

There are two points of particular interest regarding the election and time in office of Governor Ruffo. First, although the 1989 gubernatorial campaign was run amid widespread calls for alternation of parties in power and intense efforts on the part of local citizens to protect the vote on election day, in fact, Ruffo won the governorship with a smaller percentage of the electorate participating than in the five preceding gubernatorial elections. Abstentionism in 1989 measured 52.3 percent. Moreover, a significant proportion of the votes cast for the National Action Party candidate came from disaffected PRI partisans.

Second, after the 1992 elections no party held a majority in the Baja California state legislature, which was composed of eight delegates from the PAN, seven from the PRI, and four from the PRD. While an alliance between the PRI and PRD delegates could have placed the PAN in a minority position—and made the task of governing extremely difficult—such an alliance never materialized. Instead, two PRI delegates regularly allied themselves with the PAN legislators to ensure the passage of practically all initiatives presented by the governor to the legislature,¹¹ giving further support to allegations that it was President Salinas himself who was easing the way for the Ruffo administration.¹²

For its part, the PAN made good use of its first governorship and its special relationship with the Mexican president. Its strategy was to close in on the political center, taking ground bit by bit until it reached the heart of the system. The date for reaching this happy goal was set for the year 2000. Regarding his party's strategy, Ruffo observed: "The official party is like a retreating army; in order to avoid total defeat it must yield ground [governorships], although soon it will have to hand over the general headquarters [the presidency]" (Chávez 1994: 6; see also Merino Huerta 1993: 79).

One of the central paradoxes of the Mexican government's modernization process begun in 1982 is that the project is being implemented at the local level by opposition governments. This is certainly the case in Baja California. For example, reducing the state's budget by cutting the state-level bureaucracy began in Baja California in 1989, under Ruffo.¹³ Ruffo's argument in support of this action was the same as the president's justification six years earlier at the national level: it was high time to make the private sector serve as the engine of growth to achieve social and economic development.

¹¹ Efforts by the local PRI to expel these two legislators from the party were unsuccessful.

¹² This opinion was expressed frequently in *Zeta*. See, for example, Barroso 1995.

¹³ Budget reductions were achieved by slowing the rate at which new personnel were hired, restructuring some municipal offices, and modernizing work processes.

Yet the consequences of enlarging the private sector's role were different at these two levels of government. Salinas enjoyed the support of the traditional union bureaucracy, including the unconditional backing of corporatist organizations such as the CROM, the CROC, and the FSTSE—even though the reform reduced the economic benefits that these organizations received in exchange for their support of the system. In contrast, Ruffo not only lacked such support, he had to implement his program over the objections of the local labor leadership. (The most visible case involved the union of state employees; see Espinoza 1992b.) And yet his credentials as someone who came up through the opposition gave him the maneuvering room necessary to transform the local corporatist system by naming traditional labor leaders to positions in teacher organizations, taxi drivers' unions, and popular movements (Espinoza 1994b; Hernández Vicencio 1995).

Thus, alternation in government allowed for the opening up of the corporatist system, the first salvo in the process of political liberalization. Formal democratization of Baja California's political system built up momentum during the Ruffo governorship. For example, it was Ruffo's administration that developed a voter identity card that included the individual's photograph. Six years later, this type of voter card was adopted at the federal level, passed over strong PRI opposition in the Mexican Congress.¹⁴ Another important advance was the state's "New Law of Institutions and Electoral Processes," passed unanimously in December 1994. This law eliminated the self-certification of elections, and the leadership of state-level electoral institutions was broadened beyond parties and public officials to include nonpartisan citizen ombudsmen as voting members. The only direct role in elections that was left to the president was his right, vigorously criticized by the opposition, to name the presidential adviser to the State Electoral Council.

As significant as these advances in procedural democracy may be, there is still a possibility that they could be reversed. This susceptibility to reversal extends to include the alternation of political parties in power. Regarding changes to Mexico's corporatist structure, there is a danger of regression here as well because the PAN has failed both to propose an alternative structure and to fill the vacuum left by the displacement of the traditional corporatist leadership. Mizrahi notes: "The PAN ... has presented no alternative model for state-society relations" nor an economic project that differs from the one implemented by the federal government since 1982" (1995: 200–201). The

¹⁴ Ruffo cited as the most important achievement of his administration the opportunity he had to present his own voter identification card to President Salinas and say, "Yes, Mr. President, it can be done" (reiterating the slogan he had used throughout his campaign and time in the governor's office).

PAN's sole differentiating characteristic, according to Lorenzo Meyer, is that, beginning with Manuel Clouthier's leadership of the PAN in 1988, the party had not "addressed the direction of structural change so much as the authoritarian manner in which it is being implemented" (Meyer 1993: 70).

Although the relationship between the governor's office and the national executive has remained positive, on the whole, throughout Baja California's opposition governments, two factors did undercut state-federal relations during the second half of Ruffo's term in office. The first topic of contention involved the state's share of public revenues, discussed above (Espinoza 1995). Ruffo was highly critical of Mexico's fiscal centralism, which allocated 81 percent of each peso collected to the central government, 16 percent to the states, and 3 percent to the municipalities, asserting that the state failed to recover an amount equivalent to its contribution to the federal budget. He eventually carried his complaint directly to the federal Ministry of Finance (SHCP). The state's share of federal funding was reduced even further in December 1992 when additional resources were directed away from the states to support a new program to improve the nation's schools (Espinoza 1996). Ultimately the minister of government stepped in to resolve the conflict between Ruffo and Ministry of Finance officials by authorizing a study to ascertain whether Baja California's contributions in fact outweighed federal returns to the state. The study found that the Baja California state government was receiving 13.5 percent *more* in funding from the federal government than it contributed to the federal tax base (Espinoza 1995: 274).

Narco-trafficking was the second source of conflict between Baja California and the federal government during the Ruffo administration. In 1994 and 1995, Baja California was in the eye of the drug-trafficking hurricane. The drug trade and the violence associated with it were among the foremost issues of public concern, and the state's citizens were quick to point out the PAN government's inability to mount an effective policing effort. In his own defense, Ruffo noted that drug trafficking falls under federal, not state, jurisdiction, and that enforcement is the responsibility of the federal attorney general.

Baja California's gubernatorial elections scheduled for August 1995 were thought likely to mark the next step in party alternation by returning control of the state government to the old guard—the so-called dinosaurs—of the PRI. The reappearance of traditional campaign strategies came accompanied by expectations that the former corporatist relationship between the state and society would be reestablished as well, for, although the old leadership had been displaced, the corporatist organizational structure, and especially the corporatist

political structure, remained in place.¹⁵ In the end, the PAN candidate, Héctor Terán Terán, won the governorship, postponing for the moment the scenario of a full return to the old model.

Clearly, the frictions that had emerged during Ruffo's term as governor had not decreased the popularity of the National Action Party in Baja California. The state's citizens had elected their second PAN governor with a decisive margin (Terán Terán defeated his PRI opponent, Francisco Pérez Tejada, by 8.4 percent of the vote). The PAN also won the municipal presidencies in Tijuana and Mexicali, while the PRI carried Tecate and Ensenada. The newly elected state legislature included thirteen deputies from the PAN, eleven from the PRI, and one from the PRD. This marked numerical equilibrium between parties in the legislature presents an optimal opportunity for reestablishing more harmonious relations between the state and federal levels of government, something that would benefit both sides. Conflict between the PAN and the PRI in Baja California would only deepen Mexico's political crisis, something the administration of Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (1994–2000) clearly hopes to avoid. And state authorities are eager to build consensus, having found that a friendly relationship with the central government is indeed more profitable than an inflexible strategy such as the one pursued by Ruffo during the second half of his term (see Rodríguez and Ward 1994: 110). Zedillo spoke to this "new era" in the relationship between the two levels of government during his visit to Baja California only days after Terán Terán's inauguration on November 1, 1995: "We look forward," Zedillo affirmed, "to a relationship built on mutual trust, a relationship free of discord.... We have left the phase of political conflict behind us." He appealed to local legislators to close ranks with the governor and to join in efforts to develop workable solutions (*Cambio* 1995; Heras and Garduño 1995: 10).

Conclusion

The importance of political opening in Baja California since 1989 in advancing democratization is undeniable. Alternation catalyzed a process of liberalization which, although it has not yet brought about radical change, has transformed local political life. And yet its future remains tenuous. Advances still seem fragile and are potentially re-

¹⁵ The belief that corporatist and clientelistic relations could be revived relied on the fact that Ruffo had not been able to modify the PRI-government's corporatist organizations at their core. Such a transformation requires more than the six years of a governor's term for full consolidation. The future of Mexican corporatism, at both the national and local levels, depends on democratization of the Mexican political regime.

versible as long as there is no institutional framework for transitioning to a new political regime. Moreover, the likelihood that the National Action Party will continue to be a viable challenger to the PRI in a system of alternating political parties is twice constrained: first by the PAN's lack of a unique economic and social project, and second by the predominance of a presidentialist, authoritarian government that continues to recreate itself at all levels of Mexico's political geography. Thus it seems highly unlikely that the PAN's electoral successes in Baja California are the vanguard of a new democratic regime and a long-awaited transition in the national political system. Many Mexicans still doubt that Baja California's successful foray into alternation of the executive at the state level can be successfully replicated at the federal level.

References

- Aguilar Villanueva, Luis F. 1991. "Cambios en la gestión gubernamental y reforma del Estado." Cuadernos de Discusión, no. 1. Tijuana, B.C.: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.
- Aziz Nassif, Alberto. 1994a. "Municipio y transición política: una pareja en formación." In *En busca de la democracia municipal. La participación ciudadana en el gobierno local mexicano*, edited by Mauricio Merino. Mexico City: El Colegio de México.
- . 1994b. *Chihuahua. Historia de una alternativa*. Mexico City: La Jornada Ediciones/CIESAS.
- Barroso, Santiago. 1995. "Por nocaute técnico, Ruffo le ganó a Fierro Márquez," *Zeta* [Tijuana], September 22–28.
- Cambio*. 1995. "Nueva relación con BC: Zedillo," December 22.
- Chávez, Elías. 1994. "Ejército en retirada, el PRI 'cede' espacios, pero tendrá que entregar el cuartel general; para el 2000, 'soy materia dispuesta': Ernesto Ruffo," *Proceso* 980 (August 14).
- Espinoza, Víctor Alejandro. 1992a. *Don Crispín. Una crónica fronteriza. Memoria y diálogos de don Crispín Valle Castañeda*. 2d ed. Tijuana, B.C.: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.
- . 1992b. "Las transformaciones del corporativismo regional. Relaciones Estado-sindicato en el sector público de Baja California," *Frontera Norte* [El Colegio de la Frontera Norte] 4 (8): 79–110.
- . 1993. *Reforma del Estado y empleo público. El conflicto laboral en el sector público de Baja California*. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública.
- . 1994a. "Interrogantes de la transición," *Cuadernos de Nexos* 71 (197).
- . 1994b. "El SNTE ante la modernización educativa y la alternancia política en Baja California." Tijuana, B.C.: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. Mimeo.
- . 1995. "Gestión pública y alternancia política. Baja California, 1989–1994," *Revista de Administración Pública* 89: 265–80.

- . 1996. "Modernización educativa y cambio político en Baja California," *El Cotidiano* [UAM-Azacapotzalco] 12 (74): 44-48.
- Gilly, Adolfo. 1988. *Nuestra caída en la modernidad*. Mexico: Joan Boldó i Clement.
- Heras, Antonio, and Roberto Garduño. 1995. "Pide Zedillo a legisladores de BC cerrar filas con Terán," *La Jornada*, December 23.
- Hernández Vicencio, Tania. 1995. *Los gremios de taxistas en Tijuana. Alternancia política y corporativismo cetemista*. Colección Cuadernos, no. 7. Tijuana, B.C.: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.
- Loeza, Soledad. 1993. "La incertidumbre política mexicana," *Nexos* 186 (June): 47-59.
- Marcos. 1996. "De árboles, transgresores y odontología," *La Jornada Semanal* 45 (February 14).
- Merino Huerta, Mauricio. 1993. *La democracia pendiente. Ensayos sobre la deuda política de México*. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Meyer, Lorenzo. 1993. "El presidencialismo. Del populismo al neoliberalismo," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 55 (2).
- . 1994. "Prólogo." In *Chihuahua. Historia de una alternativa*, by Alberto Aziz Nassif. Mexico City: La Jornada Ediciones/CIESAS.
- Mizrahi, Yemile. 1995. "Democracia, eficiencia y participación: los dilemas de los gobiernos de oposición en México," *Política y Gobierno* [Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas] 2 (2).
- Ramírez, Carlos. 1995. "Archivo político," *La Crónica* [Mexicali], November 19.
- Rodríguez, Victoria E., and Peter M. Ward. 1994. *Political Change in Baja California: Democracy in the Making?* Monograph Series, no. 40. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Ziccardi, Alicia. 1995. "La tarea de gobernar: las ciudades y la gobernabilidad." In *La tarea de gobernar: gobiernos locales y demandas ciudadanas*, edited by Alicia Ziccardi. Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa/Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

5

A Case of Opposition Unity: The San Luis Potosí Democratic Coalition of 1991

Tomás Calvillo Unna

"We began this undertaking thirty-five years ago. We have never veered off course, nor turned back. We are getting nearer; the distance is closing. . . . I want to see democracy with my own eyes. That is my desire."—*Dr. Salvador Nava, 1992*

Mexico's 1991 midterm federal congressional elections marked a crucial point in the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). They were an opportunity to assert the legitimacy of his policies, the continuing popularity of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the weakness of the emergent opposition parties—and thus resolve the legitimization crisis provoked by the events of the 1988 presidential election. In other words, the midterm elections were a means to legitimize retroactively the first three years of Salinas's administration. But they were also a means to demonstrate support for the president's political and economic policies, thereby providing a popular mandate for continuity as well as approval for controversial initiatives—like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—in the second half of his six-year term. In preparation for these elections, considerable efforts had been made to rebuild the

The author is grateful for the support and comments of Wayne A. Cornelius, Jane Hindley, and Todd Eisenstadt. He also wishes to thank Lydia Torre and Isabel Monroy for their help in San Luis Potosí, along with Martha Rivera and Eduardo Baños. Translation by Jennifer Collins.